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Ben Jonson’s play Bartholomew Fair (1614) 
contains the following dialogue:
Winfife What call you the reverend elder 
you told me about?
Littlewit Rabbi Busy, sir, he is more than
an elder, he is a prophet, sir.
Quarlus O, I know him! A baker, is he not?
Littlewit He was a baker, sir, but he does 
dream now, and see visions; he 
has given over his trade.
Quarlus His Christian name is Zeal-of-the-
Land-Busy . . . A notable hypocrit-
ical vermin it is; I know him . . . 
ever in seditious motion . . . of 
a most lunatic conscience and
spleen . . . he defies all other 
learning than inspiration.
The “passion” under attack in this play is en-
thusiasm. The word, which derives from the 
Greek ενθουσιασµός, means that the “enthu-
siast” is possessed by a god. His discourse
is a mediating discourse directed by divine
inspiration and marked by intense, reli-
gious fervour. God’s message to his people, 
transmitted through the inspired prophet,
consists of a critique of the corrupt, present 
order of things and the necessity of its anni-
hilation through the establishment of an in-
corrupt, new world order. Social revolt, the
Bible taught, had the sanction of Almighty 
God as it was ethically motivated. Thus, in
Quarlus’ negative description of Rabbi Busy 
the key phrase is that the man is “ever in
seditious motion”. What this implies is that
in the seventeenth century the concept of 
“enthusiasm” was undergoing a semantic
transformation: it was now directly impli-
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Ben Jonson’s grotesque portrait of the enthusiast, which at the time was further elaborated in
philosophical, medical and religious writings, proved, however, totally unsuccessful in harness-
ing this violent passion which was gripping the lower orders in English society during the seven-
teenth century. The radical sects, inspired by the voice of God and by the teachings of the ‘Great 
Leveller’ (Christ), contested all institutions in operation at the time: they rejected the religious
doctrine of sin, preached sexual liberation and women’s emancipation; campaigned for the free-
dom of speech and the abolition of rank and private property. The millenarian spirit ran high in
those days. The Fifth Monarchists prophesied Christ’s imminent second coming, which would
establish equality, love and justice in this world. The enthusiasts held that ‘salvation’ was not 
meant to be a heavenly deliverance of the soul but an earthly liberation of the poor man’s body. 
Hence, the message communicated by the godly voice to these fighters of liberty was to rise up 
and destroy all hindrances to popular rule. Thus, in spite of all ideological and penal measures
taken against the ‘enthusiasts’, the ‘seditious’ passion eventually led to a civil war, the behead-
ing of a king and the establishment of the commonwealth.
Yet, once Oliver Cromwell had established himself as the undisputed leader of the revolution-
ary army, in the famous Putney Debates (October 1647) he himself turned against the “heretical
democracy” of the radical sects. By 1649, he had crushed all their attempts at revolt and “it was 
only a matter of time before the ranks of the gentry would be reunited. Social conservatism led
to conservative politics.”1 As “the revolution within the revolution failed”, the collective passion of 
enthusiasm began to be repressed. With the death of the protector, the commonwealth as well
came to its appointed end. Christ’s second coming had been indefinitely postponed by history as
the miracle of resurrected kingship was to determine the future course of time.
The traumatic moment marking the repression of the collective passion of ‘enthusiasm’ dates 
from the restoration of monarchy in England in 1660. For over a century, what follows this re-
pression is a fascinating ideological process of discursive sublimations aiming at the transfor-
mation of this and all other unbridled passions into the higher, soft passions appropriate for a
civilised society. “The progress of society” and the grand narrative attendant to its ascending
“stages” entailed a reformation in the code of manners as well. Thus, the idea of progress, the
foundation of which lay on the anthropological opposition of civilised/uncivilised, brought about 
a significant revision in the taxonomy of human passions: whereas in older philosophical and
other treatises “passions” had been classified horizontally in terms of antithetical pairs, they
were now arranged vertically in accordance with their “violence” or “softness”. Neutrality thus
gave way to evaluation and this evaluation reflected the order of social and racial distinctions:
the lower, unruly passions were to be found in the collective body known as “the mob” and in
the inferior races; the soft, civilised ones in the individual members of the genteel classes of the
Western world. In short, what in the past had been designated as the elemental passions of the 
human soul now came to acquire and to reflect class and race divisions. As Adam Smith noted
in The Theory of Moral Sentiments:
The amiable virtue of humanity requires, surely, a sensibility much beyond what is possessed 
by the rude vulgar of mankind . . . The amiable virtues consist in that degree of sensibility which 
surprises by its exquisite and unexpected delicacy and tenderness. The awful and respectable, 















in that degree of self-command which astonishes by its amazing superiority over the most 
ungovernable passions of human nature.2
“Propriety”, “reserve” and “decency” were signs of civilised behaviour which controlled even “the
passion by which nature unites the two sexes”. Though “naturally the most furious of all the pas-
sions, all strong expressions of it are upon every occasion indecent”.3 Therefore, the “strong ex-
pressions” of libidinal drives were confined to the lower orders of society and to the uncivilised,
primitive races. As far as literature was concerned, this “most furious of all passions” was reserved
either for the immoral “continent” as in the gothic novel, or for the profligate, aristocratic villain
whose design was to loot the investments placed upon the virginity of the bourgeois maiden.
Thus, the great social and political drama which had been acted out on the British stage in the sev-
enteenth century had, together with the rise of capitalism and colonial expansion, also announced 
the end of tragic, passionate man. Oliver Cromwell, a believer in the “immorality of the stage”, had 
closed down the theatres; Charles II reopened them.4 Drama was now turning into melodrama and
the elemental passions of the soul into “sentiments”. A new species of man appeared on the social
and imaginary stage to take the place of the enthusiast: the man of feeling.
The language of passions, a sublime, figurative language which before the eighteenth century delved
for expression into the abyss of man’s psyche, was also undergoing a purgation. John Dryden re-
wrote some of Shakespeare’s plays so as to bring them closer to the three classical unities fol-
lowed by the French dramatists. Shakespeare’s colossal yet unruly natural genius should be made
to conform to the esthetic rules of a higher stage of civilisation. The Royal Society’s linguistic mani-
festo, as expounded by Bishop Sprat, illustrates most vividly this ideological turn. To quote at length:
There is one thing more about which the society has been most solicitous; and that is the
manner of their discourse: which unless they had been very watchful to keep in due tem-
per, the whole vigour of their design, had been soon eaten by the luxury and redundancy of 
speech . . . this vicious abundance of phrase, this trick of metaphors, this volubility of tongue,
which makes so great a noise in the world. They have therefore been most rigorous in putting
into execution the only remedy that can be found for this extravagance: and that has been a
constant resolution to reject all the amplifications, digressions and swellings of style: to return
back to the primitive purity and shortness when men delivered so many things almost in an
equal number of words. They have exacted from all their members, a close, naked, natural 
way of speaking; positive expressions, clear senses; a native easiness.5
Thus, language was to be purged of all the “malign properties” of passion, in a manner not dis-
similar to what Slavoj Žižek designates as “passion in the era of decaffeinated faith”.6 The com-
municative model of inspired discourse considered the enthusiast as an empty vessel through
which God transmitted his passionate message directly to his people. By the eighteenth century,
God had retired to his heavenly mansions and did not meddle in human affairs. Newton’s Laws
had undertaken to do the job. As society progressed, telephony was to take over the function of
the mediator; witness the following from James Joyce’s Ulysses: “Hello. Kinch here. Put me on
to Edenville. Aleph, alpha: nought, nought, one.”7
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It is not without significance that in the late seventeenth and during the eighteenth centuries, the
term “passion” was gradually being superseded by terms such as “emotion”, “feeling”, “sensi-
bility”, “sentiment”, the last being often accompanied in treatises by the adjective “moral”. It was
these “moral” sentiments which were recruited to combat and subdue the violent passions of
man’s soul. What is important to note here is that, for many thinkers, the “moral” quality was 
not an inherent attribute of the “sentiment” but a behavioural effect which was motivated by the 
individual’s interest. Albert Hirschman shows this most conclusively in the first part of his semi-
nal study The Passions and the Interests which he entitles “How interests were called in to neu-
tralise the passions”.
This new, egoistic factor, which replaced the old, fundamental antithesis of the pleasure/pain
principle as the source of all passions, reconstituted the idea of “self” as it entailed a reassess-
ment of human volition in its relation not only to passions but to the body as well. For the object 
of desire and the springs of action were not determined by the impulsive (e)motions of attrac-
tion and repulsion, but by mental calculations weighing the pros and cons relating to self-inter-
est. This revision led to a profound re-evaluation of values since “values” were now entering the 
field of relativity. “Self-interest”, the hubris which once generated tragedies such as Dr. Faustus
and Macbeth, was now discovered to be the motive par excellence for the advancement and hap-
piness not only of the individual but of society as well. 
The philosophical enquiry concerning innate and acquired characteristics ran high in those days.
One school argued that moral sentiments such as benevolence, maternal love, sympathy for the
other, and the pursuit of virtue were innate in man. The other, that moral sentiments were an 
expedient; that maternal love was a fiction; that “virtue” was not in the least “disinterested”, giv-
en the fact that even religious doctrine promised the “virtuous” rewards in the afterlife. Hence,
the foundations of society did not rest on an innate sense of human sociability but on the bas-
est, egotistic passions. These, paradoxically, worked for the benefit of the many. In The Wealth 
of Nations, Adam Smith noted:
A revolution of the greatest importance to the public happiness was in this manner brought 
about by two different orders of people (the nobility and the merchants), who had not the least 
intention to serve the public. To gratify the most selfish vanity was the sole motive of the great 
proprietors. The merchants and artificers, much less ridiculous, acted merely from a view to 
their own interest and in pursuit of their own pedlar principle of turning a penny wherever a 
penny was to be got. Neither of them had either knowledge or foresight of the great revolution 
which the folly of the one, and the industry of the other, was gradually bringing about.8
Bernard Mandeville, some decades before Adam Smith, had summed it up most succinctly in
The Fable of the Bees: “Thus every part was full of vice / Yet the whole mass a paradise.”
The ideological antitheses above were not restricted to the philosophical field. They concurrently 
marked the discursive practices of literature profoundly and were seminal in the determination 
of its formal and conceptual structures. To mention just one example: in 2006 we saw in Ath-
ens a stage revival of Lessing’s famous play Sarah. To most viewers, this was a postmodern















production which turned the eighteenth-century lachrymose melodrama into a slapstick farce.
Thus, where Lessing’s audiences were dissolving into uncontrollable tears, today’s audienc-
es were bursting into uncontrollable laughter. Yet, this “reversal”, which supposedly aimed to
foreground the radical “otherness” of a cultural past in its relation to our amoral, materialistic
present, was, in historical terms, altogether deceptive. For, in my opinion, what the stage direc-
tor Yannis Houvardas did was to faithfully reproduce the antithetical viewpoints which were cur-
rent in Lessing’s times.
Lessing had been very much influenced by the English novelist Samuel Richardson, whose nov-
el Clarissa had provided the plot for Sarah. Richardson’s first novel, Pamela, dealt with the same 
theme, namely, the machinations of a licentious noble to seduce an innocent virgin of the lower 
ranks. Clarissa, for reasons which do not concern us here, succumbs. On the contrary, Pamela puts
up a valiant fight for the preservation of her virginity and succeeds in saving not only her virtue but
also the soul of the villain, who is reformed and finally marries her. The full title of this novel read
Pamela or Virtue Rewarded. No sooner was Pamela acclaimed as a bestseller than Henry Field-
ing, another great novelist of the time, published a parody entitled Shamela. Needless to say that
the parody demasked the virgin and presented her as a wily hypocrite who knew how to direct her 
“self-interest” by manipulating the other and placing an exorbitant “price” on the object of his de-
sire. Pamela is the winner in the bargain. The servant girl finally obtains the desired title of a “Lady”! 
“Morality”, in the final analysis, was an expedient tool in the field of social antagonisms.
With respect to Pamela, what proved of especial significance concerning the new paradigm on
“emotions” in its relation to fiction was the crucial way in which it affected narrative structure and
the discourse of subjectivity. Pamela is a first-person narrative written in the form of letters. A
first-person narrative constitutes the character as both subject and object. Pamela not only un-
dertakes to write her own story but also observes and tries to articulate the inner states of her 
psyche. What we are therefore witnessing in this novel is the inaugurating moment of the inward
turn of narrative, a moment which was eventually to establish the stream of consciousness as
the protagonist in fiction at the expense of plot, action and the disinterested gaze of an observing
narrator. From an ideological point of view, though this “inward turn”, this “interior monologue”
which transformed the motion of external time into psychological “duration” and submitted the
forms of external space to the subjective gaze, eventually came to signify the separation and al-
ienation of the individual from the social other, at the same time it was privileging the very ide-
ology of other: that of individualism.
The elemental passions of the soul had expressed themselves in literature through modalities
of action and direct, dialogic confrontation with the passionate other. On the contrary, “senti-
ments” shied away from action and dialogic confrontation became an internal affair. Self com-
munication or battling with itself was to characterise the new species of man: the man of feeling.
The outward, dramatic exposure of the passionate state in which the whole body participated,
was replaced by the occasional bodily sign such as the drop of a tear, a blush, or a shy smile.
The language of pathos was becoming inaudible, inexpressible, repressed. The code of genteel
manners and of good taste, which had come to distinguish a civilised from an uncivilised soci-
ety, was now transforming society and human relations into a “text”. Realism was not, as has
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been claimed, a transparent “window” giving onto the vistas of “reality”. It was a narrative strat-
egy of interpretation which revealed what the social concealed. Thus, the winner in the social
game was always the one who was the best reader, the best interpreter: the man of sense and 
not the dupe of sensibility.
In 1771, Henry Mackenzie’s novel The Man of Feeling appeared. The great figure behind this
novel is, of course, the novelist Laurence Sterne and his masterpiece The Life and Opinions of 
Tristram Shandy, Gentleman (1759–1767). This novel deconstructed the whole edifice of the tra-
ditional narrative structures: there is no actantial model, no plot development, no sequential se-
ries of events. There are only “opinions” and these trace the intricate adventures of the mind and 
of language which struggles to express them. It is said that Laurence Sterne was the one who
coined the word “sentimentality”. In a passionless age where “reason” condemned each mind
to be an isolated, self-enclosed “island”, “feeling” was the only outlet to bring the community of 
men together. Sterne introduced into literature the modern Quixote: the sentimental man who 
was to father in time Dostoevsky’s Idiot.
In one of his Sermons, Laurence Sterne, who was a clergyman, wrote the following: 
That a man is altogether a bubble to himself . . . and that after all that can be said in this behalf, 
the truest definition that can be given of him is this that he is a selfish animal; and that all his 
actions have so strong a tincture of that character, as to show . . . that in fact, he lives only to 
himself . . . there is scarce any thing which has done more disservice to social virtue, than the 
frequent representations of human nature, under this hideous picture of deformity, which by 
leaving out all that is generous and friendly in the heart of man, has sunk him below the level 
of a brute, as if he was a composition of all that was meanspirited and selfish.9
Within three years of Sterne’s death, The Man of Feeling appeared. It has been said that the book 
should have been printed on blotting paper to absorb the reader’s tears. It was an immediate
success and initiated the vogue of “sentimentality” as the surest sign of the superiority of a per-
son. At a time when capitalism was starting to show its most barbaric, inhuman aspect, the ex-
pression of “philanthropy” and of “fellow feeling” served as the ideological smokescreen for the
civilised, “genteel” classes.
The Man of Feeling consists of scattered chapters and fragments found accidentally and put to-
gether by an editor. “Sentiments” and the logic of “plot” appear here as irreconcilable categories, 
for it is impressions associated by contiguity and not by causality which determine the muddled 
structure of this narrative. David Hartley’s associationist system, as expounded in the Observa-
tions on Man (1749), proved seminal for this “inward turn of narrative” and for the importance
placed on “feelings”. Hartley observed that the association of ideas depended to a greater de-
gree on the recurrence of resembling states of feeling than on the train of ideas. Feeling, which
was related to the five senses, was also the motor relating ideas. Thus, a particular feeling
would cause ideas associated with it to arise and exclude others. Feeling played a powerful role 
in memory and imagination. Unlike Hume, who looked “within” and could find no “self”, Hartley
looked at feelings and located there, though indirectly, the sense of self.















The emphasis on feelings and the “inner state” created a space of privacy and security, secrecy
and silence in the novel. Voice gave way to psychic gesture. One could argue that metonymically
this “enclosure” in fiction reflected the binary, ideological opposition which was being constitut-
ed at the time: that of private versus public. Mackenzie’s hero, Harley, is the prototype in fiction
of the passive, tearful humanitarian who combats through his tender, philanthropic feelings the
injustices and abuses of the “heartless” social system. This emotive, critical confrontation with
the social, however, locks the sentimentalist into a paradox as it is thanks to this inhuman so-
cial system that the pleasure of harbouring such noble feelings arises in his heart. Hence, the
system had better remain intact!
On approaching his death, Harley confesses to his friend Charles:
This world, my dear Charles, was a scene in which I never much delighted. I was not formed for 
the bustle of the busy, nor the dissipation of the gay . . . It was a scene of dissimulation, of re-
straint, of disappointment . . . There are some feelings which perhaps are too tender to be suf-
fered by the world. The world is in general selfish, interested, and unthinking, and throws the im-
putation of romance and melancholy on every temper more susceptible than its own . . . but there
may be some better modifications of them in heaven, which may deserve the name of virtues.10
The Man of Feeling may be seen as symbolic of the demarcation which was, at that time, splitting
the social into two spheres: the sphere of culture, to which the man of feeling was relegated, and
the sphere of action which was reserved for the man of practical affairs. Politicians, as is still the
case, assumed the values of the one to further the interests of the other. Friedrich Schiller in his 
Letters upon the Aesthetical Education of Man (1795) was to provide the theoretical justification
for this determinative division. According to Schiller, it was a vain illusion to expect that social and
political struggle could ever achieve the ideals of liberty, fraternity and equality. It was only in the 
sphere of culture that the possibilities were provided for the “slave” to be transformed into a “free
citizen” and there enjoy the same rights as his master. The Victorian Matthew Arnold was to fur-
ther elaborate this thesis in his famous Culture and Anarchy (1869) by stressing the significance
of the “inner process” through which the cultured individual would arrive at a harmonious perfec-
tion of his total personality and, consequently, to the beneficial transformation of the social sphere.
“Culture” was the only answer to the explosive problems that harassed society. Are we perhaps
witnessing, in our times, a postmodern, banal revival of this (multi)culturalist programme for the 
moral improvement of man towards the creation of a “fairer” society and world?
Meanwhile, the repressed passion of enthusiasm lay in wait. Alas, the defence mechanism was
destined to collapse and the “regressive” symptoms to erupt once more in the final decades of
the eighteenth century. The outbreak of the French Revolution announced “the return of the re-
pressed”, which threatened to destroy all the achievements of progress, of refined culture, soft
sentiments and taste. The guns, real and ideological, of the terrified ruling classes were once
more turned against the new, monstrous breed of “enthusiasts”.
Edmund Burke in his famous Reflections on the Revolution in France, commenting on the Ser-
mon of the Jacobin Bishop Richard Price, stated:
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A very extraordinary miscellaneous sermon . . . mixed up in a sort of porridge of various po-
litical opinions and reflections: but the revolution in France is the grand ingredient in the caul-
dron . . . For my part, I looked on that sermon as the public declaration of a man much connect-
ed with literary cabbalers and intriguing philosophers; with political theologians, and theological 
politicians, both at home and abroad. I know they set him up as a sort of oracle . . . because he 
chants his prophetic song in exact unison with their designs. That sermon is in a strain which I 
believe has not been heard in this kingdom, in any of the pulpits . . . since the year 1648.11
Price’s Sermon concluded with the following “inspired” apostrophe: “Tremble all ye oppressors of
the world! Take warning all supporters of slavish governments and slavish hierarchies! . . . You 
cannot now hold the world in darkness. Struggle no longer against increasing light and liber-
ality. Restore to mankind their rights; and consent to the correction of abuses, before they and
you are destroyed together.” 12 Radicalism was once more raising its terrifying stature in Britain.
The “enthusiasts” declaimed that a new age of liberty was dawning which, this time, was not
dependent on Christ’s second coming but on their own persistent, collective struggles. Radical
organisations soon spread all over the kingdom.
Burke and the Anti-Jacobins, philosophers, politicians and church authorities were all unsuccessful
in containing this inherited enthusiastic passion, which had been kept down since 1660 but was now 
resurfacing to lead the British working class in its struggles against the capitalist system. Here, I
especially wish to stress the word “inherited”, since the metaphor of a “national inheritance” was
crucial in the formation of Burke’s theory of social change: a gradualist, organic process which ad-
mitted no violent breaks. It was a theory, however, which could only stand on its feet thanks to the 
principles of selection and exclusion as to what constituted a people’s “inheritance”.
Edmund Burke, fearing that the return of the repressed would lead to the loss of the “old funda-
mental principles” such as the spirit of nobility, religion and noble sentiments, exclaimed, “Along 
with its natural protectors and guardians, learning will be cast into the mire, and trodden down
under the hoofs of a swinish multitude . . . As things now stand, with everything respectable de-
stroyed without us, and an attempt to destroy within us every principle of respect, one is almost 
forced to apologise for harbouring the common feelings of men.”13 Literature, however, was to 
prove more wily than the august institutions before “the signs of the times” and the necessity for 
the formulation of new ideological strategies in the service of system. Soon, next to the man of 
feeling, the working-class subject was to appear on the scene of fiction. But this is another nar-
rative which concerns the further adventures in history of the inextinguishable, collective pas-
sion known as “enthusiasm” in its confrontation with the high and mighty.
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